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Abstract 
The paper presents a distinctive approach to cross-border ties between Europeans.  In place 
of the standard focus on identity or trust, it recommends the study of practices of social 
comparison, understood as how citizens evoke relevant others for the purpose of situating 
and evaluating their experiences.  The first section offers a conceptual analysis of social 
comparison, building on and extending social-psychological accounts. The second section 
shows how the emergence of the European Union presents new opportunities for social 
comparison.  By generating diverse social encounters, new information resources, and an 
extension in the scope of common legislation, it invites citizens to compare their daily 
experiences with those of people further afield and to evoke reference groups outside their 
country of residence.  The third section looks at the political significance of these emergent 
practices, be it for the perception of injustice, the sense of personal misfortune, or the 
development of new forms of cross-national subjecthood. 
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Parallel Lives: Social Comparison 
Across National Boundaries  
 
1. Introduction 
One way to approach the human world is in terms of a distinction between 
system and social integration.  Theorists have made it in various forms, so let 
us delineate it as follows.  System integration evokes a world whose 
emergence and reproduction is not reducible to the intentions and 
understandings of individual actors within it.  It is the world of structures and 
institutions, including the market, the law and the industrial-technological 
complex, all seen from an observer’s perspective.  Social integration by 
contrast evokes a world of actors, and of human relations recognisable and 
meaningful to those immersed in them.  It is the world of allegiances, conflicts 
and mutual concern.1  Ultimately, system and social integration may be 
considered two different methodological responses to the same challenge – 
that of rendering the world and its patterns intelligible – and one need not 
suppose the existence of two separate spheres.  The appeal of the distinction 
lies in its ability to highlight tensions and contradictions, e.g. between 
functionality and legitimacy.  In contemporary EU scholarship, system 
integration is the prime focus of various strands of institutionalism in political 
                                                        
1 For the distinction in its original form, see Lockwood 1964, p.371; for overviews of various 
reworkings, see Mouzelis 2008, Joas and Knöbl 2009, Delanty and Rumford 2005.  In European 
studies, the relation between system and social integration was one of the main themes of debate 
amongst functionalist, federalist and neo-functionalist observers of post-War Europe as well as 
interested actors themselves.  Often these debates were framed in terms of the relative 
significance of economic integration on the one hand and political-cultural integration on the 
other, an articulation liable to create an overly strong distinction between the economic as the 
domain of material interests and system imperatives and the political-cultural as the domain of 
beliefs and ideas.   
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science, legal studies and political economy, where system-evoking notions of 
‘adaptational pressure’, ‘goodness of fit’ and ‘incentive structure’ are 
commonplace.  Social integration meanwhile has been attended to in research 
on European identity, cross-border trust and the EU’s politicisation.  Perhaps 
the standard interpretation is that the contemporary European sphere, when 
approached in terms of system integration, is considerably more densely 
enmeshed than when approached in terms of social integration, but that this 
situation cannot persist indefinitely without destabilising consequences – 
indeed, that its consequences may be fatal when the EU hits times of crisis.   
This paper addresses social integration primarily, with the aim of exploring 
one of its less familiar forms – practices of social comparison.  Its purpose is to 
show how changing popular perceptions can be conceptualised differently 
from the identity problematic commonly favoured in EU studies, and – as a 
contribution to political sociology and social psychology – to theorise in some 
detail the structure and wider implications of social comparison.  One of the 
paper’s themes however is the interplay between this form of social 
integration and the wider European context of system integration.  
Developments associated with the latter – rights to cross-border movement, 
for instance – provide opportunities and stimuli for new social relations, as 
well as perhaps depending for their long-term existence on the development 
and consolidation of these relations.   
Social comparison in the sense we shall discuss it entails a human subject’s 
evocation of relevant others for the purpose of a relative appraisal of 
conditions.  It involves positing the existence of those parallel to the self who, 
as judged against a certain criterion, may be deemed to resemble (more so or 
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less so) that self.2  These relevant others may be distant in space, and only in 
some cases encountered.  The prospect which institutional developments in 
Europe raise – especially sharply perhaps, but not unlike wider processes of 
globalisation – is that relevant others come increasingly to be perceived cross- 
as well as intra-nationally, thus entailing a widening of social horizons as new 
figures fall within attentive range.  Unlike more familiar forms of social 
integration, such as a convergence of identities, norms and values or a 
deepening of interpersonal trust, social comparison need not produce 
generally harmonious social relations.  In some cases it may spur a sense of 
common predicament, and thus the basis for ties of solidarity.  In others it 
may produce an affirmation of difference, prompting indifference or hostility 
and possibly social upheaval.  Accordingly it will have feedback effects for 
system integration, consolidating it, reforming it, or placing it in question.   
Methodologically, social comparison is best treated as an interpretative 
heuristic – a way of making sense, in idealised form, of how others in turn 
make sense of the social world. Rather than to postulate hard psychological 
laws governing beliefs and behaviour, the goal is to suggest patterned ways 
of thinking which, though likely to recur in some contexts especially, take a 
variety of forms and can produce more than one outcome, due to the way 
they combine unpredictably with secondary factors.  Social theorists use the 
concept of mechanism to capture this mix of regularity and indeterminacy 
(Elster 2007).3  Practices of social comparison and their socio-political 
consequences are usefully approached as such, sensitising us to general 
tendencies of likely significance whose articulation and impact in the 
                                                        
2 As we shall note, the perception of similarity is only one possible outcome, and even where 
present it is domain-specific.  Parallel lives are not convergent lives – the subjects retain their 
distinctiveness. 
3 Some approaches to social mechanisms (e.g. Hedström and Swedberg 1998) invoke them as 
means to give precision to an explanatory account.  Here we do not wish to explain determined 
outcomes – the practices we describe remain half-formed, and their ultimate consequences as yet 
opaque – but instead to identify some important current trends, to chart future trajectories, and 
develop the building-blocks from which explanatory 
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particular instance will still need to be analysed by historical, i.e. contextual, 
means.  By elaborating such mechanisms, we sharpen our eye for the trends 
of the present, and give orientation to future research. 
 
2. Varieties of Social Comparison and their Significance 
The concept of social comparison has its origins in social psychology 
(Festinger 1954; see also Masters and Smith 1987; Suls et al. 2002; Guimond 
2006).  Early discussions presented it as a kind of need, grounded in the 
functional importance to the individual of accurate self-appraisal.  In order to 
navigate life’s demands, particularly in a complex society, individuals require 
knowledge about their relative strengths and weaknesses, and about which 
features they share with others and which are distinctive – knowledge 
achievable only through juxtaposition with the opinions and abilities of 
others.  Comparison thus offers the subject a means of orientating and 
understanding themselves.  More recent approaches, while continuing to 
focus on motivation, have located the impulse in a need to evaluate, in 
particular to accord positive evaluation to the self.  In this perspective, 
comparison offers possibilities for enhancing self-image, especially where 
subjects deliberately pursue ‘downward comparison’ by matching themselves 
against an inferior (Suls et al. 2002).  Researchers’ ongoing focus on cognitive 
motivation clearly has much to do with the disciplinary focus of psychology.  
But related research agendas more social and political in their focus have 
emerged also, notably the study of ‘relative deprivation’ (Runciman 1966).  
Let us first consider social comparison from a formal perspective, before 
thinking about its contemporary manifestations.  Clearly not all comparison is 
‘social’.  While a human self of some sort is always present – the author of the 
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comparison – the elements of which the comparison itself is composed may 
be entirely intra-personal or non-human.  For example, one can make a cross-
temporal comparison with past selves (the ‘younger me’ with ‘today’s me’), 
comparison with an ideal standard (‘beauty’, ‘intelligence’, ‘morality’), or 
comparison with a counter-factual self (‘me as I am’ with ‘me as I might have 
been’, or ‘me as I experience things here’ with ‘me as I would experience 
things there’).  Comparison can also involve inanimate beings (a comparison 
of one law with another).  What then is social comparison?  As we shall 
understand it, social comparison has the following structure: it involves a 
human subject (X) being matched against a target person or persons (the 
comparator, Y) for assessment according to a particular dimension (Z).  While 
the author of the comparison will not always make these terms explicit4 – a 
degree of interpretation tends to be required – it should generally be possible 
for the observer to narrate the comparison act in these terms.  
Probably the first of these terms is the most straightforward.  X denotes a 
human actor of some kind.  Evidently it need not include the author of the 
comparison him / herself.  The comparison may be composed entirely of third 
persons, as when a law-maker considers which of two potential recipients of 
scarce resources is most deserving, or when a citizen chooses which party to 
vote for.5  First-person comparisons will be our focus, since they have an 
immediacy and emotional involvement not present when the author detaches 
him- / herself, but they are only one variety of several.  Note also that the 
subject may appear in singular or plural form – as an ‘I’ or a ‘we’.  Note 
further that subjects may come with a certain category attached, e.g. ‘we as 
women’, ‘we as black people’, or ‘I as a Muslim’.  We shall return to some of 
the implications of this later. 
                                                        
4 Indeed, there may be cases when one wants to speak of tacit comparisons – those not given 
explicit articulation at all, yet seemingly implicit in certain acts and utterances. 
5 One of the biases of psychology-informed approaches to social comparison is the way the self 
and self-esteem tend to be placed centre-stage as a matter of course. 
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Next in our formal sequence is the comparator, Y (sometimes termed the 
‘comparative reference group’ – Runciman 1966, p.11).  It may be useful to 
conceive three guises in which the comparator may appear.  First (Type 1), it 
may be an individual who is closely familiar to the subject, probably as a 
result of repeated encounters.  In such cases the subject will have a sizeable 
body of information about this person, enabling a variety of comparisons, and 
is likely to think of this person first as an individual and only secondarily as 
the representative of a social group.6  Examples would be friends, family 
members and colleagues.  Second (Type 2), the comparator may again be a 
really-existing person, but one encountered only briefly or occasionally.  The 
subject therefore has limited information about them, and they remain largely 
a stranger.  They may be associated primarily with a single context and 
treated either as a social type or, where their individuality is affirmed, as a 
distantly remembered ‘name’.  One’s hairdresser or bank manager might be 
examples.  Third (Type 3), the comparator may be an idealised type who is 
simply imagined by the subject.  With this comparator there are no moments 
of co-presence, and they are necessarily thought of in generic terms (and also, 
therefore, as members of a group rather than as separable individuals).  Their 
existence may be suggested to the subject on the basis of publicly available 
information (e.g. in the media, in official data, or in political discourse) and 
anecdotal knowledge or ‘popular wisdom’, mixed in with ingrained 
memories of past experiences.  In this case the subject is dependent on their 
imagination and on narratives and knowledge resources external to their own 
conscious experience. 
If one accepts these as analytical distinctions – and clearly there will be 
empirical instances whose correct assignment to one class or another will be a 
matter for debate – then one can accord them different kinds of significance.  
                                                        
6 On the way personal ties may foster comparison practices, see Gartrell in Walker and Smith 
2002. 
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The first kind – based on repeated co-presence – is the most private scenario, 
and its significance is likely to be local.  Regarding the comparator in this way 
does not involve treating them as a manifestation of a larger context (the point 
is exactly that the individual is seen as transcending their circumstances) and 
so the implications of the comparison act are likewise likely to be for the 
subject as an individual.  As regards the second kind – based on rare co-
presence – much is likely to depend on the contact situation (Pettigrew 1998).  
There will be contexts in which the comparator’s individuality is highlighted, 
and others where they appear primarily as categories: for example, when 
there is a clear mediating role relationship (a waiter serving a customer, a 
boss addressing an employee) which invites the situation to be experienced in 
stereotyped terms, or sharp markers of difference (e.g. language), or when the 
encounter is entirely new, with no previous interaction to refer to.  Different 
situations will invite different forms of aspect perception.  While in the first 
case the situation becomes analogous with that based on comparison with 
familiars, in the latter cases it moves closer to the third kind – comparison not 
grounded in co-presence.  Here, with the comparator knowable only as a 
category (e.g. the ‘worker’, ‘the Frenchman’), we have arguably the most 
political scenario.  Politics in many of its forms requires people to think of 
each other in categorical terms – that is, to look beyond the peculiar 
characteristics of individuals and beyond whatever private connections one 
might have to them so as to place them in a larger scheme.7  Comparisons of 
this kind facilitate the abstraction which politics requires.  They are also 
political in the sense that they are the site of power relations, since they are 
                                                        
7 This is not to overlook that efforts to encourage people not to think in category terms, and 
instead to personalise or privatise a situation, may themselves be political in character.  Consider 
for example the use of first names by British politicians when referring to their colleagues – a 
strategy presumably designed to increase perceptions of them as accessible people rather than 
career politicians. 
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peculiarly susceptible to manipulation, not being dependent on the subject’s 
personal experiences.8 
We have introduced X and Y as persons, real or imagined.  It is worth 
emphasising however that, even in those cases where they are real, it is not 
persons in their entirety which can be the currency of comparison.  Given the 
complexity of any individual, they can never be apprehended with equal 
regard for all dimensions of their existence: comparison involves singling out 
a certain aspect on which to focus.  This brings us to the third of our terms, Z, 
the dimension or criterion of comparison.  This may take various forms: it 
may relate for instance to a person’s circumstances (e.g. their problems or 
privileges), their skill in a certain task, or their opinions on a certain topic.  
Where the comparator, Y, is simply an imagined social category, the criterion 
of comparison may be largely self-evident, since that category may have few 
dimensions of public significance.  Where the comparator is evoked with 
greater specificity and complexity, and thus permits a wider range of 
comparisons, the subject will need to exercise discrimination in the dimension 
they choose.  Note that Z can be anchored with respect to an ideal, such that X 
and Y are compared for how closely they approximate a transcendental 
standard, be it a positive one such as ‘the moral life’ or a negative one such as 
‘brutality’.  Alternatively it can be strictly relative, such that X and Y are 
compared e.g. for the length of their hair, with no embedded notion that there 
is an ideal length.   
Clearly, some dimensions of comparison will be of greater interest to the 
political sociologist than others.  Facebook invites users to compare their 
‘friends’ according to their looks and their smell, while daily life offers many 
opportunities to compare personal possessions such as mobile phones.  While 
                                                        
8 Like all forms of common sense, social comparison is both a source of power (the power to 
normalise) and that which is shaped through power.    
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these practices are interesting in a number of ways, particularly from a social-
psychological perspective, their political implications are indirect at best.  
More interesting in this regard is when the criterion of comparison concerns 
such non-trivial life circumstances as employment, living conditions, security, 
relative purchasing power, and so on – dimensions we shall return to shortly. 
It is worth emphasising that the act of comparison may lead to varied 
outcomes.  It may produce the affirmation of sameness or equivalence (an 
outcome our language usage may lead us to expect, in that when we term 
things ‘comparable’ we imply not only that they can be compared but that a 
comparison will lead us to conclude similarity), and a tendency to assimilate X 
and Y.  Alternatively the outcome may be to affirm difference between the 
subject and the comparator, and thus to contrast X and Y – although such a 
conclusion still supposes the same metric can be applied to both, and 
therefore implies a second-order resemblance.  In either case, the outcome can 
be treated as something positive, negative or neutral: it will be ascribed a 
certain valence.  Furthermore, the conclusions drawn may focus on what the 
comparison indicates about the nature of X (the subject) or the nature of Y (the 
relevant other).  Note, finally, something implicit in what we have said so far 
(and in the social-psychological distinction between ‘upward’ and 
‘downward’ comparisons): not all acts of comparison are open-ended in the 
sense that they have no preconceived outcome.  Some are loaded in advance, 
such that X, Y and Z are chosen so as to affirm something the comparison-
maker wishes to affirm. 
These points may be summarised in tabular form: 
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Elements of 
social 
comparison 
X – the subject Y – the comparator Z – the dimension of 
comparison 
Outcome 
 
 
 
 
 
Characteristics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Here: the first-
person 
pronouns, ‘I’ or 
‘we’ 
 
Type 1: a real individual, 
familiar due to repeated 
exposure 
 
Type 2: a real individual, 
but known through 
limited and context-
specific exposure, hence 
associated with just one 
or a small number of 
roles 
 
Type 3: an imagined 
entity, approached as a 
social category 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Normative (i.e. 
connected to an 
ideal)  
or relative 
 
 
 
Affirmation of 
similarity or 
difference … 
 
 
 
Given positive, 
negative or neutral 
evaluation 
Overview of social comparison 
 
Why though does social comparison matter?  What are the reasons to study 
it?  Arguably it has an intrinsic interest as a distinctive form of social practice, 
one irreducible to related notions such as ‘identity’.  Yet its significance goes 
beyond this.  Indeed, much of human understanding has a comparative 
dimension.  This includes, first, an understanding of oneself and one’s 
predicaments.  How an individual sees their own experiences will depend in 
part on how far they have the ability and inclination to place these in a larger 
context and see them as replicated elsewhere, or how far conversely they see 
these experiences as mainly specific to themselves.  For instance, it matters 
greatly for a person’s self-understanding whether they perceive certain 
economic difficulties as mainly a distinct, personal challenge or whether they 
see them as shared, and if the latter with whom they see them as shared and 
with whom not at all or less so.  This may influence the extent to which they 
see these challenges as ‘normal’ or unusual, and how far they see them as 
appropriate targets for collective address or a matter for individual 
adaptation.   
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Note, second, that practices of social comparison may have important 
implications for the meanings commonly given to concepts with a relational 
dimension.  Notions for instance of poverty, equality, security, risk, quality of 
life (including living conditions, health, work-leisure balance and the quality 
of nutrition) and of geographical location (including the status of being 
peripheral or central) are all to some degree – even if not entirely – relative.  
What constitutes poverty depends on how one delimits the social field.  This 
has, furthermore, implications for how people distinguish between what is 
just and unjust, insofar as some types of justice-claim refer to the relative 
deprivation of groups of citizens rather than to the absolute condition of the 
individual (Feinberg 1974).   
Practices of social comparison may take place even where there is no 
generalised sense of shared subjecthood of the overarching territorial kind 
implied by terms such as ‘national’ or ‘European identity’, or issue-specific 
relations of solidarity such as the ‘class for itself’.  Thicker forms of social 
integration of this kind are one possible outcome of social comparison, but 
they are not the same as it.  Indeed, there may be places where ties of 
empathy and solidarity are quite weak yet where practices of comparison are 
common: the former Yugoslavia would seem a candidate in this regard.  
Likewise, as a practice of interpretation rather than a material fact, social 
comparison cannot be assimilated to a positivist conception of shared identity 
or of the ‘class in itself’ (both of which take us back towards the realm of 
system integration).9  Social comparison is a distinct category of practice and 
merits its own investigation. 
 
                                                        
9 For a typology of forms of collective subjectivity, see Domingues 1995.  Note the configurations 
evoked through social comparison cannot be subsumed within any one of the types provided, 
though elements of several may be involved.  
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3. Social Comparison in the Transnational Setting 
What impact might the institutional changes associated with European 
integration have on practices of social comparison?  Without itemising these 
system changes in detail – their particularities are in any case in flux – we can 
make the guiding assumption that they create new opportunities for social 
comparison and increase the likelihood it will take cross-national form.  In the 
most general sense, this is because conditions of instability and change are 
always likely to be those which prompt recourse to comparison, since such 
conditions are disorienting and place the traditional scheme of things in 
doubt.  It is when people become uncertain of their circumstances and status 
that they may be most impelled to seek reorientation through comparison.   
But there are also more specific grounds for seeing these processes of change 
as conducive to social comparison.  Let us examine a few of them. 
First, these processes of system integration generate new kinds of social 
encounter, and thus new situations inviting social comparison.  They 
contribute to many of the ‘mobilities’ identifiable amongst contemporary 
Europeans (Urry 2007, pp.10-11).  Prominent amongst these are those 
associated with temporary employment migration, tourist trips, family visits, 
the adventure-seeking travel of young people, travel for the purpose of 
receiving medical care, and long-term relocation for employment or 
retirement reasons.  Some such movements will lead to in-depth cross-
national acquaintanceships of the kind that invite Type 1 social comparisons.  
Think for example of a chance encounter between students while Inter-
Railing, developed into stronger attachments in the course of time spent 
travelling together, and later kept alive using a virtual network such as 
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Facebook.  Think likewise of the Erasmus exchange.10  As noted, these may 
not be the source of the most politically-interesting forms of social 
comparison, insofar as they generate mainly personal connections, but they 
are stimuli nonetheless.  Of course, many such forms of mobility will not 
result in thick, repeated interactions but in one-off or occasional moments of 
co-presence: in this sense they may be conducive to Type 2 social 
comparisons.  Modern life in general affords many such sites of encounter 
where strangers are brought together, from the metro carriage and the bus-
stop to the shopping mall and the museum (Urry 2007, p.37).  Transnational 
integration, insofar as it intensifies cross-border movement, heightens the 
centrality of sites bringing together a potentially even more diverse set of 
strangers: the hotel, the airport, the beach, the carriage of the trans-continental 
train, the bars and clubs favoured by travellers and stag-nights, the 
(internationalised) university library and canteen, the football stadium, and 
the passport control queue. 
One must be cautious in conceiving the wider significance of such encounters.  
The guise in which people appear to one another in such locations may be 
quite site-specific: e.g. as the fellow passenger, the fellow shopper, the fellow 
drinker.  Insofar as comparisons are provoked, they may be specific to the 
social categories associated with these situations: for instance, the beach may 
invite comparisons of beachwear, body shape and suntan, and the football 
stadium those of intensity of support and richness of chants – criteria 
potentially of little relevance to other social settings.  But one can assume that 
such sites provoke other comparisons whose significance is transferable: a 
comparison of what fellow commuters are reading with one’s own reading 
matter may lead to wider assessments of the relative sophistication and 
                                                        
10 Encounters stemming from the Erasmus programme certainly need not lead to a heightened 
sense of ‘European identity’ – cf. Sigalas 2010 – but may still contribute to a broadening of the 
scope of social comparison. 
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awareness of ones fellows, comparisons of considerable significance for the 
individual’s understanding of the world around them and their place within 
it.  Likewise the passport control queue, which evokes and institutionalises 
hierarchies, and invites citizenship-, culture- and class-related comparisons, 
has a significance beyond itself.11  Even the airport baggage reclaim, which 
seems to invite little more than a comparison of suitcases, may potentially be 
a rich source of class- and taste-related comparisons liable to become 
entwined with comparisons made in other locations.   
An extension of the sites of everyday social encounter represents just one of 
the relevant consequences of transnational integration.  Potentially of greater 
political significance is the way it invites Type 3 social comparison, involving 
the evocation of those with whom there are no moments of co-presence.  The 
evocation of these hypothesised or ‘imagined’ comparators is fostered first by 
the standardisation of experience which system integration entails.  With the 
development of the EU, Europeans have been exposed to common legislation 
(where there are harmonised EU rules) or to legislation which, though 
different from one country to the next, is designed to meet common 
objectives.  Common quality standards on consumer goods, or the single 
currency, are obvious examples.  Insofar as legal integration entails an 
extension of (imagined) common experiences before the law, it seems likely to 
foster the conditions in which comparison presents itself as plausible, and to 
foster the conjuring of comparators abroad whose experiences bring those of 
the subject into relief.  In the absence of a larger common framework, the 
social world beyond the nation-state presents itself as ‘apples’ to the nation’s 
‘oranges’, and therefore as an inappropriate target of comparison.  Legal 
                                                        
11 Cf. Urry 2007 p.151 and Aaltola 2005 as cited.   
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harmonisation changes this.12  Moreover, system integration makes possible 
not just one or a series of unrelated dimensions of comparison but dimensions 
which present themselves in clusters.  One of the best established findings in 
social comparison research is that individuals are most inclined to compare 
their personal circumstances with those of people they consider broadly 
similar to themselves as judged on secondary factors presumed relevant to 
the dimension in question (Festinger 1954).  For example, a comparison of 
earnings is likely to be of interest to an individual only if there is perceived 
similarity with the comparator on related dimensions (e.g. age, job type or 
level of education), something which requires that for every one dimension 
(Z) it be possible to imagine other dimensions plausibly in correlation with it.  
By making several of these susceptible to measurement on single, pan-
European scales, EU integration invites them to be invoked in conjunction 
with each other, thus raising the appeal of any single comparative dimension. 
Of course, transnational integration does not necessarily produce these 
outcomes, since it also has countervailing dynamics.  One of its consequences, 
before the effects of common legislation are felt, may be to expose people to 
greater extremes.  Think, for instance, of the migrant labourer who changes 
his reference groups while living abroad, and who unwittingly provides 
material for a new reference group both for those in the host society and those 
in the country of origin.  For criteria of comparison such as wages or living 
conditions, such individuals may introduce new levels of variation.  At best 
this may produce an assertion of difference – albeit one that supposes, as 
noted, sufficient similarity to apply the common metric by which difference 
can be observed.  Just as plausibly it may encourage a retreat into narrower 
                                                        
12 The plausibility of comparison is likely to be deemed all the stronger where interdependence 
between subject and comparator is assumed: where, in other words, the circumstances of the 
comparator are considered not just equivalent to those of the subject but connected. 
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forms of comparison and a rejection of those that highlight wide 
discrepancies.  We shall return to this point in due course. 
The mere presumption on the subject’s part that the experiences of distant 
strangers are of relevance is likely to be strongest where it has a basis in fact.  
The question then is whether transnational integration comes accompanied by 
the availability of information which can give foundation to comparisons.  
One thinks for instance of quantitative data of the kind which evokes social 
groups across European space as statistical categories – the kind of 
anonymous comparators one can associate with Type 3 comparison.13  There 
are a wide range of criteria for which cross-national data can be collected: 
data which affords comparison for instance of prices and purchasing power, 
of earnings across different employment sectors, of taxation rates for different 
income groups, of public spending in different policy sectors, of crime trends, 
and so on.  Information of this kind is collected by countries around the 
world, and the possibility of drawing on it to make cross-national 
comparisons is hardly a novel phenomenon.  But as comparativist social 
scientists have often been the first to discover, making cross-national 
comparisons on the basis of data aggregated separately in different countries 
can be highly problematic, since the methods used to collect it in different 
places may be quite dissimilar, and the categories used to organise it may 
have quite different thresholds of inclusion.  The measurement of poverty and 
inequality is a classic instance: those classed as ‘poor’ in one country may be 
very much better off than those classed as poor in another (Fahey 2010).14  
                                                        
13 While quantitative data especially lends itself to this, there may be plenty of qualitative 
empirical comparisons to be made too, e.g. of the fortunes of different party families from one 
country to the next. 
14 Cf. Fahey 2010, p.12: ‘in the UK, a single person household with an income of 11,000 PPS would 
be counted as poor (just below the UK poverty threshold of 11,366), while a similar household 
with the same income in Poland would be counted as well off in that they would have almost 
double the Polish median of 5,703 PPS. Many of the poor in Britain thus have higher living 
standards than the Polish middle classes, not to mind the Polish poor, so that it might reasonably 
Jonathan White 
 
 
17   
 
What presents itself as a single criterion of comparison may in fact therefore 
be a compound of two, and while such data may continue erroneously to be 
drawn on for comparison purposes, when their limitations become known 
they are likely to be rejected and perhaps the very possibility of comparison 
questioned.  One of the interesting implications of EU integration is the 
possibility it holds for the collection of data organised at a transnational level 
using a pan-European scale – a possibility the Commission has sought to take 
advantage of as it makes moves to replace a series of national benchmarks 
with an indicator of material deprivation expressed in pan-EU terms.  An 
ongoing debate in social-policy research concerns whether the European 
frame of reference is the most appropriate or whether the national should 
remain the default one – a question which can be answered with appeal to a 
variety of criteria, including policy relevance, the observer’s assessment of 
what is objectively valid, and the standards that citizens themselves use 
(Fahey 2010) (Whelan and Maitre 2009).  There is no definitive answer – each 
is an act of interpretation, as well as a move with political implications – but 
let us simply note that where the European option is chosen it provides a 
further knowledge resource for those tempted to engage in practices of cross-
national comparison.   
Clearly, where factual information of this kind is taken up in the media, its 
public diffusion is likely to be greater.  Relevant instances are not difficult to 
find.  As a country low on ‘European identity’, Britain makes a critical case.  
Its print media shows a willingness to run stories based entirely on how 
Britain compares to specific other European countries or a European average 
along a particular dimension, in some cases drawing directly on Eurostat 
data, in others cases on private sources.  Many of these stories have a ‘bad 
                                                                                                                                                               
be asked whether there is any sense in which the extent and nature of poverty in these two 
contexts might need to be captured somewhat differently.’ 
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news’ flavour, with the article’s key point being that Britain does worse than 
its comparator(s) with respect to the criterion in question – that it ‘tops the 
league’, be it the ‘jobless league’15, the ‘crime league’16 or the ‘divorce league’.17  
Likewise an article in the German media which, drawing on Eurostat data, 
reports ‘Bad Marks for Germany on Women’s Pay’.18  Even that most euro-
sceptic of outlets, the British Daily Mail, has run stories premised on the 
relevance of cross-national comparisons and well stocked with empirical data 
on the ‘European average’: ‘Let’s all go to France!’, was one writer’s 
suggestion, ‘British quality of life can’t compare to the continent’.19  Note that 
the subject of these comparisons continues to be framed in national terms: it is 
‘Britain’, ‘Germany’ etc. which is being compared to other countries, not 
particular sub-groups with other sub-groups – even if the comparisons could 
easily be reframed in these terms (as in the case of gender disadvantage).20  
Note also the imagery of the ‘league’, which invites the dimension of 
comparison to be seen in purely relational terms without an anchoring ideal 
standard.  
There have been fairly few studies of whether lay practices of social 
comparison amongst Europeans are likewise prone to include cross-national 
elements.  Some researchers have attempted to explore this with opinion 
polls, notably (Delhey and Kohler 2006), where the focus is on levels of life 
                                                        
15 www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/britain-tops-jobless-league-table-
2103407.html 
16
 www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1541699/Britain-tops-European-crime-league.html  
17
 www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/this-britain/divorce-rate-falls-but-uk-still-tops-european-league-
673779.html 
18 www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,476658,00.html 
19
 www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1314112/France--Lets-British-quality-life-compare-
continent.html.    
20 Nonetheless, one can find examples which, even if still based on cross-national comparison, are 
not focused on the experience of one particular nation in comparison to others.  See for example a 
different kind of reporting of Europe’s ‘gender pay gap’ in the Guardian 
(www.guardian.co.uk/money/2007/jul/18/pay.business) and BBC 
(http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/6904434.stm).  See also the Guardian’s ‘Europe season’ (from 14th 
March 2011), which encouraged readers to learn how their ‘neighbours’ Germany, France, Spain 
and Poland respond to a common set of everyday social and political challenges 
(www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/mar/13/germany-guardian-new-europe-series). 
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satisfaction.  Their research finds that, amongst the population groups studied 
(Turkey, Hungary, Western and Eastern Germany), 75% of respondents, 
when asked to assess their own standard of living, made cross-national 
comparisons in addition to those with friends, neighbours and co-nationals.  
The possible range of comparators was set by the survey designers in 
advance: they do not include all EU and European countries, nor do they 
feature countries beyond Europe (the list being: Switzerland, Netherlands, 
Sweden, France, Poland, Spain, Italy, Hungary and Germany).  While this 
limits what we can infer about the content of cross-national comparisons – in 
particular, whether the respondent wishes to emphasise circumstances in 
specifically these countries, and how far one can speak of a ‘europeanisation’ 
of reference groups rather than a few targeted, ‘bilateral’ references to specific 
country groups – it nonetheless suggests an assumption of the national 
boundedness of comparison practices is problematic.   
The point comes through also in qualitative research.21  In a study conducted 
by the author (White 2011; 2009), group interviews with citizens in Germany, 
Britain and the Czech Republic concerning a range of everyday problems (e.g. 
high and rising prices, low wages) produced a number of spontaneous cross-
national comparisons.  One of the study’s suggested findings is that, in line 
with the above, the range of comparators is likely to vary according to the 
criterion of comparison (i.e. where Z changes, so one can expect Y to change).  
Whereas economic issues tend to produce comparisons with neighbouring 
European countries (but not necessarily Europe as a whole), issues to do with 
intergroup relations (e.g. the ability to successfully integrate immigrants) tend 
to provoke a wider range of comparators more broadly associated with the 
                                                        
21 For an interesting study of how the EU is taught in French schools, see Bozec 2010, including 
p.168 for observations on how teacher-led initiatives to establish pen-pal links with schools in 
Poland, Germany and Spain led to practices of cross-national social comparison amongst pupils.  
See also the autobiographical narratives of Europe’s highly mobile ‘eurostars’ in Favell 2008, 
many of which display elements of social comparison (see chapter 1 for early examples).  
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‘West’.  Issues of law and order, by contrast, tend to produce few cross-
national comparisons – probably because such issues are seen as local in their 
origins and effects.  At least for the medium term, rather than a generalised 
trend towards Europe-wide practices of comparison, it seems most plausible 
to expect a series of spheres whose extension varies from one issue domain to 
the next. 
 
4. Implications of an Enlarging Scope of Comparison 
So far we have examined the formal structure of social comparison, some of 
the reasons to expect its evolution to include cross-national dimensions, and 
the existing research that has looked into this.  Insofar as such developments 
are real, what implications might they hold for social integration in Europe 
more generally, beyond the widening horizons of awareness and perceived 
relevance that social comparison signals?  What are the likely consequences of 
an enlarging scope of comparison?  We shall tackle this question at the level 
of lay citizens, though clearly a parallel line of research would involve posing 
it at the level of political and economic elites.  In either case, what interests us 
is to identify some of the patterned sequences social comparison may give rise 
to, even if – as with social mechanisms generally – these are various, possibly 
contradictory, and the pre-eminence of one over another is not to be 
determined ex ante.  
Evidently one likely consequence of wider comparison is the recalibration of 
people’s sense of their own social position.  System integration introduces a 
whole new range of comparators.  Exposed to a wider variety of human 
experiences in Europe, people may come to rethink how they stand relative to 
others.  Those who see themselves as of low economic or social status, 
Jonathan White 
 
 
21   
 
confronted with the yet worse circumstances of those elsewhere, may come to 
rethink themselves as part of a ‘comfortable middle’.  Those of high status in a 
local setting (e.g. the provincial businessman, or the stand-out student of the 
local university) may come to question their superiority.  In other words, by 
offering new points of comparison, the cross-national context prompts 
revisions to existing practices of comparison.  The proverbial big fish may be 
recast as modest fare, just as the small fish is revealed to be not so minor after 
all.22  This may be a disorienting and distressing process for some, as a sudden 
reappraisal can prompt feelings of humiliation, but in principle one would 
expect it to be a positive experience for others.  New feelings of relative 
deprivation might be counter-balanced by new feelings of ‘relative 
gratification’ as it has been called (Pettigrew 2002).  This twin dynamic is 
foreseeable even at the intra-personal level, as shifts on one dimension of 
comparison are compensated by shifts on another.  If this process of 
reappraisal were engaged in by all equally, one would expect something 
approaching an overall balance in the numbers of those who came to reassess 
themselves positively or negatively – the process would be ‘zero-sum’ in its 
reallocation of self-worth.23   
But here lies the crux: such symmetry of practice seems unlikely.  Social 
comparison, it has been suggested, is pursued with most urgency by those 
who sense or fear that in relative terms they are not doing well.  Those who 
are comfortably off (by whatever criterion) may be less aware of their 
                                                        
22 Note also that European integration has the potential to generate new criteria of comparison 
(Z) which produce new scales of advantage and disadvantage – e.g. to do with the ability to access 
the benefits of integration itself.  The very novelty of these dimensions may give them added 
levels of public resonance.   
23 For an overview of different emotional responses to social comparison, see Smith in Suls and 
Wheeler 2000, esp. p.176, which describes four basic variants: downward-assimilative 
comparisons (producing shared concerns and sympathy), downwards-contrastive (with 
contempt / Schadenfreude / self-satisfaction), upward-contrastive (with envy / depression) and 
upward-assimilative (with admiration / inspiration / optimism).   
Parallel Lives 
 22 
advantage, and less concerned to verify it, than are those less well off.24  The 
latter have added incentive to engage in comparison, whether to learn more 
about their predicament or to console themselves with the knowledge that it 
is shared, perhaps even experienced more severely elsewhere.25  This would 
suggest a preponderance of cross-national comparisons amongst those who, 
in the existing order, feel aggrieved or insecure – e.g. the poor in a wealthy, 
west-European country, or the poor and middle classes in a medium-to-poor 
central- / east- or south-European country.  It would likewise suggest 
particular attentiveness to those dimensions (Z) on which the subject is 
thought to fare badly (an impulse which the league-table examples above 
seem to appeal to).  Furthermore, ‘upward’ comparisons – those which 
establish or are premised on the superiority of the comparator’s 
circumstances over those of the subject – may be the ones which lodge 
themselves most firmly in the subject’s imagination.  If there is asymmetry in 
the comparisons pursued, it would seem to suggest the following proposition: 
1) Cross-national social comparisons tend at the aggregate level to increase 
perceptions of relative deprivation without a corresponding increase in 
perceptions of relative advantage.   
European integration would, in other words, make Europeans on balance feel 
a little bit worse about themselves.26   
Let us leave aside the normative issues this raises – whether for example 
popular dissatisfaction of this kind, based on relative rather than absolute 
appraisal, is something one should want to avoid or whether it can be a 
                                                        
24 Cf. Walker and Smith p.137 on the idea that the advantaged tend to take their advantage for 
granted, and tend to be weakly inclined to see themselves as part of an advantaged group.  
25 This point needs to be balanced against the fact that expectations may be higher amongst high-
status groups (and disappointments thus correspondingly stronger), as well as the likelihood 
that factual knowledge about other locations is higher amongst these groups. 
26 This will be all the more true if there is a dynamic dimension to the appraisal, such that ‘our’ 
condition is said not just to be bad but deteriorating. 
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source of inspiration for positive political change and thus a valuable 
component of citizenship.  Let us focus instead on the sufficiently complex 
political-sociological dimensions.  If heightened perceptions of relative 
deprivation are a predictable outcome of cross-national social comparison, 
one might infer two plausible but opposed conclusions.  On the one hand one 
might see comparisons as generative of heightened levels of individual stress 
for which individual solutions are sought.  Such an outcome could take 
several forms: it could entail feelings of resentment towards those whom 
comparisons reveal to be advantaged; efforts to rationalise the discrepancy 
e.g. by appeal to notions of merit; moves to close the gap through individual 
adaptation; an inclination to retreat from wider social commitments so as to 
minimise the adverse feelings they produce; or a tendency to deny the 
feasibility of cross-national comparison, or to switch the dimension of 
comparison (Z) so as to produce more favourable results (e.g. to renounce a 
prosperity criterion in favour of a morality one – ‘they’ are rich, but ‘I’ / ‘we’ 
are good).27  One is reminded of Elster’s description of the ‘sour grapes’ 
phenomenon, a classic strategy for coping with dissatisfaction (Elster 1985).  
In the short to medium term, cross-national comparisons would then seem to 
have few destabilising political consequences.  Indeed, insofar as they 
relativise experiences (e.g. of poverty) by showing how there is ‘always 
someone worse off’, they may produce apathy and prove actively 
immobilising.28  Still, in the longer term, this tendency could be expected to 
have subversive consequences, as it might easily entail the slow ebbing of 
support for the very institutional frameworks which prompt these 
                                                        
27 A retreat from social comparison may be accentuated insofar as integration exposes 
individuals to those whose preferred criteria of assessment are different from their own, and 
who thus serve to undermine the validity of the reference criteria hitherto invoked – a variation 
of Durkheim’s anomie. 
28 This effect is accentuated insofar as integration exposes individuals to those prioritising 
criteria of assessment different from their own, and who thus undermine the validity of the 
reference criteria hitherto invoked.   
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unfavourable comparisons.  The EU’s political legitimacy would in this way 
be weakened.   
Yet there is a counter-tendency one might also foresee: an emergent 
awareness of personal disadvantage spurring moves to seek out others who 
share in this predicament, perhaps so as to make common cause.  The initial 
act of social comparison which reveals relative disadvantage, and which 
therefore has an unsettling character, would thus be coupled with a second 
one that re-embeds the individual in a larger collective and forms the basis for 
an enlarged sense of ‘we’.  In this scenario, social comparison fosters the 
emergence of new bonds of solidarity and cross-national subjecthood.  It 
enables moves towards the emergence of classes for themselves, as the 
familiar terminology has it (though classes in the broad, not necessarily 
economic, sense).  This way lies the transnationalisation of social cleavages 
and potentially their politicisation at a European level.  Insofar as these forms 
of subjecthood translate into specific political demands, one could expect 
them to impinge on the institutional structure of the EU and its legal order in 
the form of pressure for its redesign – i.e. to have fairly immediate 
consequences for system integration.  Protest movements, including 
contemporary ones against the ‘austerity’ programmes being pushed by 
governments across Europe, involve efforts to evoke a popular sense of 
equivalence with precisely such goals in mind, and when their organisers 
acknowledge the inspiration of counterparts abroad they themselves are 
testifying to the mobilisatory capacity of the comparative logic.29 
Again, for clarity’s sake, we can express these alternatives in propositional 
form: 
                                                        
29 On British student protesters taking inspiration from Spain, see 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jun/20/student-walkouts-public-sector-strikes. 
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2a) The adaptation thesis: when cross-national social comparisons heighten 
perceptions of relative deprivation, citizens will look for narratives that can 
rationalise this, and / or make individual efforts to change their relative standing, 
and / or resist the making of comparisons, and / or seek to restructure them in 
more favourable ways. 
2b) The mobilisation thesis: when cross-national social comparisons heighten 
perceptions of relative deprivation, citizens will seek out and make common cause 
with those revealed to be similarly disadvantaged. 
Here is not the place to settle the matter, but perhaps the following can be 
noted.  Scholars of relative deprivation make a potentially relevant distinction 
concerning how the comparison subject (figure X in our typology) comes to be 
articulated.  When a speaker presents their sense of comparative 
disadvantage using the first person singular, ‘I’, this may be referred to as 
personal deprivation: it is as an individual that the subject feels deprived.  
When a speaker presents the matter using the first person plural ‘we’, this 
may be thought of as group deprivation: it is as part of a collective that the 
subject feels deprived (Walker and Smith 2002).30  Both can be a basis for 
comparison, but the consequences of the first are likely to be mainly 
psychological and local – e.g. individual displeasure, and perhaps an 
individual effort to improve relative standing – rather than an organised 
effort to find collective voice.  The consequences of the second on the other 
hand may be wider in scope and more likely to bring social change: 
comparisons formulated in this way suggest that individual responses are 
inappropriate, and suggest the possibility of common cause.  This would 
suggest that, as a minimum condition for orchestrated efforts at wider change, 
the subject’s comparison of their circumstances with those of cross-national 
                                                        
30 Runciman 1966, pp.31ff., makes a related distinction between egoistic and fraternalist 
deprivation. 
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others must take the form of a comparison of ‘people like us’, not merely of 
‘individuals like me’.  In contemporary Europe, this disposition hardly seems 
extinguished, but must contend nevertheless with a tendency in public 
discourse to individualise the citizen, and to acknowledge political demands 
primarily in the form of individual rights (White 2009, 2010). 
Much is also likely to depend on whether the discrepancies which social 
comparison reveals are held to be remediable or unavoidable.  For even 
where there is a sense of collective deprivation, this may produce no more 
than silent acquiescence if it is felt to be rooted in immutable conditions.31  
There needs to be the sense that tomorrow can be better than today.  The 
implications of social comparison are inseparable from the wider political 
narratives by which those comparisons and their meaning are shaped (White 
2011).  There is an interesting interplay here between social comparison and 
perceptions of agency.  On the one hand, it is through comparisons that the 
space for agency can be opened, since those which highlight the variety of 
human experience show the ways in which things could be different – e.g. the 
different ways in which public services can be organised and financed.  
Encouraging comparisons is one way of affirming the possibility of 
alternatives and reducing political acquiescence.  On the other hand, 
comparisons unaccompanied by a narrative about the possibility of realising 
these alternatives, ‘here’ as much as ‘there’, may rather provoke envy or 
demoralisation.  In all these aspects one sees the dimension of power: those 
who shape these wider narratives, be they partisan actors in the 
parliamentary sphere or the media, have considerable influence over the 
extent to which the fruits of comparison are resignation or agitation.  Their 
ability to ‘nudge’ people towards a certain comparator (Sunstein and Thaler 
                                                        
31 Note the fourth dimension of Runciman’s definition (p.10): ‘[…] A is relatively deprived of X 
when (i) he does not have X, (ii) he sees some other person or persons […] as having X (whether 
this is or will be in fact the case), (iii) he wants X, and (iv) he sees it as feasible that he should 
have X.’ 
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2008), and to influence how the comparison act is interpreted, is a notable 
source of power. 
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper has examined how processes of system integration at the 
transnational level present new opportunities for the practices of social 
comparison.  By generating diverse social encounters, new information 
resources, and an extension in the scope of common legislation, these 
processes invite citizens to compare their daily experiences with those of 
people further afield and to evoke reference groups outside their country of 
residence.  Conceptions e.g. of economic hardship – who experiences it, who 
escapes it – have the potential thereby to draw in reference-points beyond the 
boundaries of the nation-state.  Drawing on findings from recent research, the 
paper has discussed how far, and when, such possibilities are likely to be 
realised, and the potential political significance of these practices.   
To what extent should the comparison act be seen as a contribution to social 
integration?  Clearly we are dealing with something much less demanding 
than is implied by notions of common identity.  The structure of social 
comparison asserts the fact that the subject and comparator are ontologically 
separable, even if deemed to be similar – and any assertion of similarity is 
always specific to a particular metric of comparison.  At the same time social 
comparison may form the basis for the emergence of thicker ties.  Stronger 
bonds of collectivity may well demand the prior recognition of an equivalence 
of social position, as well as the motivation to find common cause that a sense 
of injustice promotes.  By widening public conceptions of social and political 
space, and underscoring similarities and discrepancies of experience, 
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comparisons offer an enabling context for this.  They offer the basis on which 
further political narratives may draw.  However, though they may be a 
necessary condition of deeper social integration, they are hardly a sufficient 
one.  In some forms they may have the opposite effect of causing political 
disengagement and the rejection of the institutional arrangements that enable 
them.  Comparisons can be divisive as well as integrative.  Their ultimate 
contribution will depend as much on the kind of comparisons citizens are 
invited to make and the conclusions they are encouraged to draw – factors 
inseparable from larger efforts to shape the contours of political 
commonsense. 
Let us conclude with some observations on what cross-national comparison 
implies for the continuing hold of the nation-state as the reference-point for 
popular self-understanding.  As we have indicated, the subject (X) and 
comparator (Y) of social comparison need in no way be denominated using 
national categories: numerous alternatives are possible (professional, gender-
based, generational, etc.), and when these are invoked there is no reason to 
suppose their frame of reference will be domestic to the national sphere.  
Social comparison thereby reduces the salience of national boundaries, even 
without putting them in question.  Where comparisons do refer to the 
national unit (think of the league-tables mentioned), a twin process is at work: 
the relevance of the national unit is reaffirmed, yet it is simultaneously placed 
in a larger frame, inviting the citizen to step back to adopt a broader 
perspective.  National boundaries remain a landmark, but no longer form the 
horizon.  Social comparison thus effects a shift in their status.  In doing so, it 
may also put strain on some varieties of nationalist thought.  Social 
comparison can have an unsettling quality, placing established ideas of status 
in question, and undermining notions of the privileged self.  It makes a 
precarious underpinning for national pride.  Furthermore, as we have seen 
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with parts of the British media, comparisons may come more easily with 
those neighbouring European countries held in little affection than with those 
more distant countries (e.g. the US) with whom such outlets actively promote 
popular identification.  Such discrepancies are logically tenable, but require a 
double gaze that may be difficult to sustain.  They remind at the same time 
that there is a multi-dimensionality to even the most Eurosceptic orientations, 
one that would be missed if one focused exclusively on practices of 
identification.  
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